7885

INDEPENDENT VOTING.

Careful consideration is earnestly requested to the within proposed constitutional amendment, in its present condensed and permissive form.

It should now have unanimous support.

CHAUTAUQUA COUNTY NY HISTORICAL SOCIETY 2013

A PLAN

FOR

Independent Voting

WITHIN

POLITICAL PARTY LINES.

SUGGESTED BY

PLINY T. SEXTON, LL. D.,

REGENT OF THE UNIVERSITY, ETC.

"Which are to be preferred in voting: Men or Measures?"

Why not both?

CHAUTAUQUA COUNTY NY HISTORICAL SOCIETY 2013

EDITORS OF NEWSPAPERS

are earnestly requested to give careful consideration to the within suggested electoral plan; to comment and advise concerning the same, and to send marked copies of their papers, containing their helpful thoughts, to Hon. Henry R. Durfee, member of Constitutional Convention, Albany, N. Y.

FAVORING FRIENDS

who receive this pamphlet and desire the adoption of its proposed plan for Independent Voting within Political Party Lines, are requested to make such wish known by writing and speaking to members of the Constitutional Convention, and also to sign postal card petitions therefor, procure signatures of others favorable thereto, and promptly mail such cards. It would also be helpful if they would procure and send enlarged petitions of the same purport.

ADVOCATES OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION

in legislative bodies, etc., should be interested in the within suggested plan. It would obviate some of the serious objections urged against their hitherto proposed systems. Perplexing complexities of voting and canvassing would be removed, and in the nearest possible degree exact equity always secured, by allotting to each political party representation from each election district in the proportion that its party vote cast therein shall bear to the total vote of the district, — the successful candidates of each party to be those receiving the greater number of votes within their respective parties. It being then safe for a political party to divide its votes among any number of its own candidates, electors would have, as is not otherwise possible, unrestrained freedom of personal choice between their own party's official and substituted candidates.

EXPLANATION.

The proposed constitutional amendment No. 331, which was introduced by Mr. Durfee, by request, on July 12, 1894, was designated as a plan for "independent voting within political party lines," — that being its objective purpose.

The amendment, as then introduced, contained much of details not so naturally matter for desirable constitutional treatment, perhaps, as for legislative enactment. It was thought better, however, when the proposed amendment was first formulated, to attempt to show therein with some fullness a workable scheme, by which the desired independent voting might be effectuated, — which, of course, could be done in various ways. The particular method which was suggested in the original proposed amendment, is set forth and illustrated in the appendix to this pamphlet.

Later reflection having made it seem desirable to eliminate from the proposed amendment the more distinctive legislative matter, and retain for constitutional sanction simply the central thought, or principle, of independent voting within political party lines, for that purpose there has been prepared the accompanying condensed substitute for the proposed constitutional amendment, No. 331.

Such substitute has been cast also in the permissive rather than the mandatory form, in deference to the views of many who favor the principle, but think it wiser to leave its application optional with the legislature, so that it may have an experimental stage and be easily modified, or abandoned, as its practical working shall require.

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[CONDENSED SUBSTITUTE FOR]

Proposed Constitutional Amendment

NO. 331.

(Introduced by Mr. Durfee, by request, July 12, 1894.)

PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

To amend article two of the constitution (to be known as section six) relating to the method of electing public officers.

The Delegates of the People of the State of New York, in Convention assembled, do propose as follows:

Article two of the constitution is hereby amended by adding a new section as follows:

Sec. 6. *To enable electors to vote in concert with others in approval and for the promotion of public policies preferred by them, and at the same time freely to exercise independent choice of official party candidates for public offices, or to substitute other candidates therefor, it is hereby provided that, in such manner, under such regulations and in connection with such public offices as the legislature shall prescribe, electors in voting may indicate the person they wish to elect to any such office and the political party they prefer to support in connection therewith; and that the person elected to any such prescribed office shall be the one who receives therefor the greater number of votes from the supporters of the political party for which the greater number of electors indicate a preference in connection with their votes for candidates for such office.*

A SUGGESTED PLAN

FOR

INDEPENDENT VOTING WITHIN PARTY LINES.

Attention is requested to the accompanying proposed Constitutional Amendment, which seeks to provide a method of choosing public officers, that shall permit electors, in voting, to remain loyal to their party and its principles, and, at the same time, to exercise with full freedom their individual preferences in selecting the persons who shall represent their party in public office.

It should be clearly understood, at the outset, that the proposed independent voting within political party lines, *does not contemplate any change whatever in our theory of government*, nor necessarily any *essential change* in our *methods* of electing public officers.

We will still be governed, as heretofore, by the stronger political party, and such party will still choose within itself those of its members who shall represent the party in public office and carry into effect the party policies.

The only change which the proposed amendment seeks to make possible is as to when and how political parties shall finally determine who shall represent them in public office.

The following briefly stated propositions and explanations will indicate the need for and illustrate the anticipated working and usefulness of the suggested improved plan for finally determining the choice of public officers.

Popular government, which we desire to have and maintain in this country, of necessity means government by party. Those whose views of public policy coincide will and should unite in efforts to have such views guide in the affairs of government.

Believing that in the multitude of counsels there is wisdom, we readily agree to accept the policy favored by the greater number, and consent that such greater number who think alike and act together (and thus constitute a political party), shall decide among themselves who of their number shall give effect to their views in public office.

The soundness of this outlined theory of desirable popular government probably will not be questioned. The failure to realize fully the blessings expected therefrom, and the existence of the evils which we suffer thereunder, are owing mainly to defects in the machinery by which it is sought to put such theory into practice.

That we have so much of inferiority and maladministration in public office, is not because the people generally are not fully capable or not desirous of choosing wise and faithful public servants; but rather because, under our present system of nominating and electing such servants, the choice of the latter is too often dictated by a small minority, instead of by the theoretically intended plurality, of the dominant party.

It has been expected that the preferences of such plurality would guide in the pre-election caucuses and conventions of their party in its selection of candidates for public office.

In practice it has been found that the action of such assemblies is frequently and deplorably controlled by a very small and unworthy minority of the party, and that their nominees are weak and venal men, selected for selfish purposes, incompatible with faithful public service in office.

It may be said that the remedy for unfit nominees is to refuse to vote for them. But, under our present electoral system, refusal to vote for the candidates of a political party, involves, in their defeat at the polls, the destruction of the party's supremacy in the administration of the government. The candidates of the opposing party come into office, to put into execution an unwelcome public policy.

It hence results that, too often, electors find themselves permitted at the polls only a choice between evils. To help maintain the supremacy of their party and the political principles which they think most useful in promoting the public welfare, electors frequently must vote for unworthy men to represent their party in public office.

Party ties of all kinds strongly influence voters, and more often than otherwise will they conclude that the harm a bad man may do in office will not be so great as to have the control of the government fall into the hands of the opposing political party. It is the strength of such feelings that has made it possible for small conspiring cliques to control large parties by manipulating party caucuses and conventions, in which the unorganized, and frequently uninformed, but usually well-meaning men of the party are easily overcome, or led to ill-considered action, by selfish professional machine politicians.

Their domination is widely deplored. How shall it be overthrown?

Only by a method of choosing public officers which will allow electors to vote in concert with others of like political belief, to maintain in power the party of their choice, and at the same time permit them to repudiate its unworthy official nominees and substitute therefor better men of the same party, without by so doing in any way endangering the success of their party in the election.

In other words, INDEPENDENT VOTING WITHIN POLITICAL PARTY LINES *must be made practicable.*

And it is now asked that, by this proposed constitutional amendment, the legislature be permitted, in its discretion, to accomplish such purpose — which it is contemplated may be done by enacting, in substance, the following provisions:

Arrange that in voting electors may indicate the party of their choice and in connection therewith the persons they wish to have represent their party in public office.

In canvassing the votes, ascertain first which party has been preferred thereby by the greater number of those voting for a particular office.

Then declare elected to such office the person who received therefor the greater number of the votes of the supporters of such dominant party.

Under such method of electing public officers, we would then have in fact, as in theory we now desire, the government administered by the party whose policy should best commend itself to the greater number of voters; and the elective public offices would be sure to be filled by representatives of such party and by those preferred by the greater number of such party's supporters.

As before stated, the only essential difference from our present system would be one of method and time, in ascertaining the choice of the greater number of any party as to who should be its agents in public office.

Practice has shown that the real choice of a party at large cannot easily be ascertained through pre-election caucuses, and hence such real choice does not now generally prevail, as it certainly would under the suggested new method.

HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF PENNSYLVANIA COUNTY WYNNEWOOD

It would still be, and *more freely than now*, the desirable popular government — *by plurality of the people as to policy, and by plurality of such plurality in selecting public officials.*

We submit to government by the stronger party, not only because we must, but in general we submit willingly and peaceably to such government, upon the accepted theory that the united wisdom of the many is greater than that of the few, and that the judgment of the many is likely to be the safer guide.

But the theory of the greater wisdom and better judgment of the many does not end its possible usefulness in deciding upon governmental policies. It should be equally regarded in choosing public officers to carry into effect public policies.

Obviously a preferred public policy should be executed by those who believe therein and hence should be chosen therefor by the political party which favors said policy.

Belief in a favored public policy is not, however, the only desirable qualification for public office; and in the interest of all of the people it is important that the political party which, by virtue of its greater strength in numbers, is entitled to choose the incumbents of public offices, should be guided in such choosing by the greater wisdom and safer judgment of the many, rather than the few, among its members.

The more fully and freely that such greater wisdom and better judgment of the many find expression in the choice by political parties of their representatives in public office, the higher will be the character and the greater the capacity and efficiency of public officials.

It is well known, however, that, as before stated, under existing electoral methods, it not infrequently happens that political parties are constrained to elect public officials who, in fact, are not personally acceptable to their party at large.

We charge the stronger party with the responsibility of governing; but its agents, who are to administer the government, we require such party to select and finally agree upon in its pre-election caucuses and conventions, when and where the larger part of the party cannot or will not understandingly, or in actual fact, take part in making such selection. The difficulties are almost insurmountable in the way of ascertaining in pre-election caucuses and conventions, the real preponderating preferences of a political party as to who shall be its candidates for public office.

Experience has fully shown that caucuses and conventions are seldom attended by more than a small minority of a party, and are easily controlled and led by combinations of designing and selfish men into making unsatisfactory nominations, such as would not be and are not approved by the party at large, but which its members usually accept and vote for rather than have their party defeated at the polls.

To repeat, it is right here that there arises the necessity for a feasible method of independent voting *within party lines;* for independent voting — meaning the repudiation of bad nominations — cannot be induced to any regular and helpful extent, so long as such repudiation involves probable or possible party defeat. To get voters in any large numbers to bolt unfit nominations made by their party caucuses or conventions, it must be made possible to reject such nominations without endangering party success.

It may be and often has been said that the members generally of a party ought to attend its primary elections and there prevent improper nominations from being made.

The fact remains, nevertheless, that full attendance at such gatherings cannot be obtained; and if it could, usually but few members of a party would then be sufficiently informed concerning the characters and qualifications of aspirants for nomination to office to judge intelligently between them. Nor would all voters really know at such times which party they would finally wish to support.

But after official nominations are made and the search-lights of a political canvass are turned upon candidates, their merits and demerits soon become well known, and voters are thus made better able to form intelligent judgments as to the fitness of such candidates for public office.

The great mass of people in all parties are well meaning and expect no personal gain from their party's supremacy, other than the blessings of good government, in which all would share alike; and whether altogether honest themselves, or not, they have sufficient sagacity to make them prefer to be ruled by honest and capable men.

There can be no reasonable doubt that the preponderating judgment of any political party would quickly crystallize against an unworthy nominee, and lead to his rejection and the substitution at the polls of a better candidate, if such action were possible without jeopardizing party supremacy.

To make such action freely possible is, as stated, the direct purpose of the proposed constitutional amendment.

It intends to make it easy for conscientious voters to bolt bad nominations, without being required to bolt or help defeat their party.

If this be made possible, by the proposed constitutional and legislative action, it is expected that when a bad nomination is made by a party caucus or convention, the better men of the party will easily be roused to concerted action in bringing forward and recommending some other and conspicuously worthy man to be voted for as an opposing candidate within the party. And such substituted candidate almost invariably would be a man of conspicuous worth, for it would be well understood that it would be difficult to defeat an official nominee by any other opposing candidate than one of well-known and widely-recognized high character and proven capacity

It has been suggested that under the proposed plan there might be an objectionable multiplicity of candidates. There would be no real trouble in that direction. Doubtless there would be, as now, some scattering votes; but electors generally would not then, more than now, deliberately throw away their votes, even when the contest was simply between men within their party. It cannot be doubted that in such a contest the better man, the one who would be most useful in public office, would be supported by vastly the greater number of his party. And clearly it would be a gain to the people at large, as well as to any party, to have the better man put into office.

It therefore can work no injustice to any one, nor be any just ground for objection from even opposing and numerically weaker political parties, if the law shall permit the stronger political party freely to disagree and divide within itself as to the comparative merits of the men whom it would select for public officers.

If we agree that the stronger party shall administer the government, we certainly will prefer that it shall govern us through the agency of its better men.

And the greater the freedom for such divided thought, and the more fully is invoked thoughtful consideration, by all the members of a party, of the relative fitness in character and capacity of its proposed candidates for public office, the greater is the probability that the better men will be selected.

Obviously, also, the probability of such wiser and more desirable choice being made, will increase as the members at large of a party become better informed concerning their competing candidates. Consequently, and for such indicated reason, it is desirable that the final decisive choice between such candidates shall be deferred until the latest possible moment, that is, until the time of the actual election, thus permitting the judgment of voters to be most fully informed by all of the discussions and revelations of the entire pre-election political canvass.

This is just what our proposed amendment contemplates.

Campaigns of education may be as highly useful in informing the judgments of voters as to the relative merits of candidates for office within their own parties, as in enabling them to judge understandingly of the probable public usefulness of differing political party policies.

Therefore, while recognizing, as our present electoral system does, the right of the stronger political party to govern, and its right to decide within itself whom it will put into public office to govern for it, *our new plan (and this is its only change of substance) provides that the final decisive choice, within the party, of its representatives in public office may be deferred until and be made at the time and in connection with the act of voting at the actual election; when, as before indicated, voters will have become most fully informed and be better able to choose understandingly, and when, also, more than at any other time, can be obtained an expression of preference by more nearly all of the members of the party.*

Over our present practice, the proposed changed method will be an improvement, in that it will cause our public officers to be chosen with better understanding by those who make the choice, and will cause the choice to be made by actual participation therein of greatly many more minds.

It will give us the benefit in such choosing of the greater wisdom and safer judgment of the many, rather than of the few; *and measurably forefend against the always greater possibility that where such choosing is left to a few the choice may be influenced by selfish or corrupt considerations.*

The harmful features of caucus rule would largely dissappear, for it would be understood quickly by machine politicians that an improper nomination would be repudiated at the polls, since, under the suggested plan, that could be done so easily without endangering party success.

Probably in practical effect, the proposed electoral method would be more largely preventive than necessarily curative of the evils of the present system; for the venal men who, for selfish purposes, now obtain nomination to public office, by corrupt manipulation of political party machinery, would realize that a nomination thus procured was no longer equivalent to an election. They would know that they must still submit to a careful public scrutiny and prove themselves worthy in character and capacity, or they would not be voted for at the polls by their party at large.

And, it ceasing to be profitable for unscrupulous men to control caucus action, party organizations would come to be guided more generally by those who sincerely wish to promote the public welfare.

The proposed plan would strengthen parties, rather than otherwise—operating as a safety-valve for the expression of both reasonable and unreasonable internal dissent from official nominations, and there would be general acquiescence in the final fairly-obtained decisions of the greater number of the party.

It can be no real objection to the proposed plan for independent voting within party lines, that it would prevent, as now sometimes happens, a minority party from slipping its candidate into office, because of internal differences in the stronger party. Such mishaps are not likely to be, and in the past have not been more profitable to one of the leading parties than to the other.

And upon sound principle, a district that is preponderatingly favorable to a particular political party, ought to be represented in office by a member of such party. The only practical contention should be within the party itself, as to who should be its representative.

It is not intended by this declaration to object to the doctrine, favored by many, of proportional representation. That is a subject with which the plan we are presently considering has no necessary connection, but which our plan would, rather than otherwise, render more easy of practical application.

At first thought it may appear to some where a numerically stronger political party divides its votes between two of its own candidates for a particular office, and neither receives as many direct votes therefor as are given by the weaker, but united, opposing party to its single candidate that the latter, because of having the most direct votes, should be considered to be the choice of the greater number of the people, and hence rightfully elected to such office.

The misconception arises from overlooking the fact that, under our proposed new plan, all who vote for either candidate of the stronger party for any particular office, will do so, knowing that their votes will help elect some candidate of that party, and, consequently, by such votes they clearly express a preference for all of the candidates therefor of such party, as against all candidates of all other parties. Therefore, as between all candidates, the preferred candidate of the stronger party would be the actual choice of the greater number of the people. A fuller statement and explanation of this point appears in the appendix hereto, in the illustration given of an imaginary election for governor.

Changing, then, in nowise our accepted theory of popular government, and proposing no change in our electoral methods, except such as will tend to more fully carry into effect such accepted theory, there is every reason in favor and none against such action by the Constitutional Convention as will make it possible for the legislature in its discretion to modify, as suggested, our present method by which political parties select their candidates for public office.

Very likely conservatism would suggest experimental trial of the proposed freedom of independent voting within political party lines, and would think it wise to first observe the working of the plan in connection with a few prescribed offices.

Those who have most confidence in the value of the proposed method of choosing public officers would be content to have the principle thus tested.

If in practice it should fail to justify its usefulness, it could easily be abandoned. Nor is there danger that the legislature would inconsiderately give it even an experimental trial.

Certainly there can be no danger in the Constitutional Convention adopting the proposed amendment in its suggested permissive form.

And surely the evils which grow out of our present method of selecting public officers, are so manifest and so great, that some effort should be made to find remedies therefor.

They are evils which strike at the very foundation of and imperil the perpetuity of popular government.

PALMYRA, N. Y., *August* 2, 1894.

PLINY T. SEXTON.

APPENDIX.

MONROE COUNTY NY HISTORICAL SOCIETY 2013

Illustration by an Imaginary Election for Governor.

The Republican party, dividing its vote between its official candidate, John Doe, and its more satisfactory substituted candidate, Richard Roe, gave them, respectively:

John Doe	600 votes
Richard Roe	900 "
Total Republican votes	1,500
The Democratic party voted solidly, giving to John Brown, the total Democratic votes	1,000
The Prohibition party gave to John Jones, the total Prohibition votes	600
Total votes cast	3,100

The Republican party, having a plurality of all the votes cast, is entitled to choose the governor, and as, between its own candidates, Richard Roe received the most votes, he is the choice of his own party for and is thereby elected to that office.

It may be thought, at first glance, that Richard Roe's 900 direct Republican votes should not make him governor in preference to John Brown, who received 1,000 direct Democratic votes, and that the latter is really the choice of the most people.

But not so.

As between John Brown, who received directly his entire party votes (1,000), and Richard Roe, the latter is the choice of the entire 1,500 Republican voters; for all who voted for either of the Republican candidates, knew their votes would, and hence clearly wished they should, help elect Republican Richard Roe in preference to the Democrat John Brown, or any candidate of any opposition party.

Therefore, it being ascertained that the Republican party was supported by a plurality of all the people, and that Richard Roe was the choice of that party, both within itself and as against the candidates of all other parties, said Richard Roe was duly elected governor by the actually expressed choice of a plurality of all of the people.

And that is just as much so as if, before going to the polls to vote at the actual election, the Republican party had taken a preliminary informal vote of all of its members (if that were possible) who voted at the actual election, and having thus ascertained definitely that Richard Roe was preferred by the greater number of his party, said party had then all cast their 1,500 votes directly for him at said actual election.

It will be seen that our new plan makes no departure from our accepted theory of government, which is still to be administered in accordance with the wishes of, and by the officials preferred by, the greater number of the people.

The only change, of substance, which the suggested new plan makes is simply to change the time as to when a political party shall, within itself, decide who shall represent it in public office. And the proposed change in that particular should commend itself by the fact that at the time and in the act of voting, a more candid and intelligent judgment can be obtained and from more nearly the entire party than is otherwise possible.

To restate, in part, the preferred candidate of the stronger party, would be also the personal choice of all of his party, as against the candidates of other parties. As before mentioned, that fact would be shown by their voting his party ticket, knowing that thereby they would help elect him as against all candidates of other parties. If, upon personal grounds, they preferred some candidate of another party, they would vote directly for the latter.

That is what voters do now, in such cases. There would be no change in that particular.

Under our present system, the fact that an elector votes for the official candidate of his party, does not show that such candidate is personally satisfactory to the voter. It only shows that, all things considered, the latter prefers such candidate over the candidates of opposing parties.

And under the proposed new system, if the elector votes for either the official or substituted candidate of his party, it will equally show that he prefers either of such candidates over the candidates of all other parties.

Hence, it is clear that the stronger candidate of the stronger party would be, more nearly than under our present mode of election, the actual choice of a greater number of all of the people, as against any other candidate, of any party, for the same office.

And that certainly would conform to the test we now think should be applied in determining who, of several candidates for public office, shall be declared elected thereto.

SAMPLE BALLOTS.

The following sample ballots are designed to illustrate a method of voting and canvassing which would give effect to the foregoing suggested plan for choosing public officers. Various other methods or machinery could easily be devised to carry out the same principle, as the legislature might think preferable.

Of course it would not be necessary to print the "instructions to voters" on the ballots, although it might be desirable to do so — perhaps preferably upon their backs, and then more fully with directions as to folding ballots, etc. In any case, however, full and suitable instructions should be printed in large type and conspicuously posted in each separate compartment at the polls.

These sample ballots show only two groups of candidates, but, of course, in practice, the official blanket ballots would contain separate groups for each office to be filled at any election.

The first and second sample ballots show that the electors voted, respectively, straight Republican and straight Democratic tickets.

The third sample ballot shows that the elector was a Democrat, but was not satisfied with his party's official candidate for governor and substituted therefor the name of another Democrat whom he preferred for that office. He voted, however, for the party's official candidate for lieutenant-governor.

The fourth sample ballot shows the voter to have been also a Democrat, who substituted his own preferred candidates for both governor and lieutenant-governor.

A canvass of the sample ballots by their party designations shows that of the votes cast for governor there were:

DEMOCRATIC, 3. REPUBLICAN, 1.

Hence, properly, the governor chosen should be a Democrat.

A re-canvass of the Democratic votes for governor shows that for that office the official Democratic nominee, John T. Hoffman, received one vote, and the substituted Democratic candidate, Horatio Seymour, received two votes, and that the latter was thereby elected governor.

A further canvass of the sample ballots, under the same rules, discloses that the official Democratic candidate for lieutenant-governor was the choice of the greater number of the dominant party for that office, and was thereby elected thereto.

CHAUTAUQUA COUNTY NY HISTORICAL SOCIETY

(1st SAMPLE.)

OFFICIAL BALLOT.

PARTY NUMBERS AND NAMES.

1	x	REPUBLICAN.
2		DEMOCRATIC.
3		PROHIBITION.
4		POPULIST.

INSTRUCTIONS TO VOTERS.

To vote for all of the official candidates of a party, mark a cross (x) between that party's number and name at the head of your ballot.

To vote separately for an individual official candidate, mark a cross (x) between his name and party number, but do not make any mark opposite either party's name at the head of your ballot.

To vote for another than the official nominee of the elector's party, write or affix at the bottom of the printed group of candidates for the particular office, the name of the substituted candidate, and mark at the left of his name the number of the political party which the elector wishes to support, but do not make any mark opposite either party's name at the head of your ballot.

For Governor,

1	EDWIN D. MORGAN.
2	JOHN T. HOFFMAN.
3	MYRON H. CLARK.
4	JOHN BROWN.

For Lieutenant-Governor,

1	ROBERT CAMPBELL.
2	SANFORD E. CHURCH.
3	JAMES SMITH.
4	RICHARD ROE.

(2d SAMPLE.)

OFFICIAL BALLOT.

PARTY NUMBERS AND NAMES.

1		REPUBLICAN.
2	x	DEMOCRATIC.
3		PROHIBITION.
4		POPULIST.

INSTRUCTIONS TO VOTERS.

To vote for all of the official candidates of a party, mark a cross (x) between that party's number and name at the head of your ballot.

To vote separately for an individual official candidate, mark a cross (x) between his name and party number, but do not make any mark opposite either party's name at the head of your ballot.

To vote for another than the official nominee of the elector's party, write or affix at the bottom of the printed group of candidates for the particular office, the name of the substituted candidate, and mark at the left of his name the number of the political party which the elector wishes to support, but do not make any mark opposite either party's name at the head of your ballot.

For Governor,

1	EDWIN D. MORGAN.
2	JOHN T. HOFFMAN.
3	MYRON H. CLARK.
4	JOHN BROWN.

For Lieutenant-Governor,

1	ROBERT CAMPBELL.
2	SANFORD E. CHURCH.
3	JAMES SMITH.
4	RICHARD ROE.

CHAUTAUQUA COUNTY HISTORICAL SOCIETY 2013

(3d SAMPLE.)

OFFICIAL BALLOT.

PARTY NUMBERS AND NAMES.

1 REPUBLICAN.
2 DEMOCRATIC.
3 PROHIBITION.
4 POPULIST.

INSTRUCTIONS TO VOTERS.

To vote for all of the official candidates of a party, mark a cross (x) between that party's number and name at the head of your ballot.

To vote separately for an individual official candidate, mark a cross (x) between his name and party number, but do not make any mark opposite either party's name at the head of your ballot.

To vote for another than the official nominee of the elector's party, write or affix at the bottom of the printed group of candidates for the particular office, the name of the substituted candidate, and mark at the left of his name the number of the political party which the elector wishes to support, but do not make any mark opposite either party's name at the head of your ballot.

For Governor,

1 EDWIN D. MORGAN.
2 JOHN T. HOFFMAN.
3 MYRON H. CLARK.
4 JOHN BROWN.
2 *Horatio Seymour.*

For Lieutenant-Governor,

1 ROBERT CAMPBELL.
2 x SANFORD E. CHURCH.
3 JAMES SMITH.
4 RICHARD ROE.

(4th SAMPLE.)

OFFICIAL BALLOT.

PARTY NUMBERS AND NAMES.

1 REPUBLICAN.
2 DEMOCRATIC.
3 PROHIBITION.
4 POPULIST.

INSTRUCTIONS TO VOTERS.

To vote for all of the official candidates of a party, mark a cross (x) between that party's number and name at the head of your ballot.

To vote separately for an individual official candidate, mark a cross (x) between his name and party number, but do not make any mark opposite either party's name at the head of your ballot.

To vote for another than the official nominee of the elector's party, write or affix at the bottom of the printed group of candidates for the particular office, the name of the substituted candidate, and mark at the left of his name the number of the political party which the elector wishes to support, but do not make any mark opposite either party's name at the head of your ballot.

For Governor,

1 EDWIN D. MORGAN.
2 JOHN T. HOFFMAN.
3 MYRON H. CLARK.
4 JOHN BROWN.
2 *Horatio Seymour.*

For Lieutenant-Governor,

1 ROBERT CAMPBELL.
2 SANFORD E. CHURCH.
3 JAMES SMITH.
4 RICHARD ROE.
2 *John Doe.*

CHAUTAUQUA COUNTY NY HISTORICAL SOCIETY 2013