

Hillbros' Landing 25th 1870

Hon. A. W. Loughe

Dear Sir,

I received your letter of the 24th inst. this morning, and reply at my earliest convenience as requested.

I have regretted to see the comments made by some of our public journals, upon your action in the case alluded to by you; because I thought at the time, and I still think, it was right and proper. The facts in the case, are, as I recollect them, that Dennis Heains, (coloured) was indicted at Spring Term 1869 for larceny. The State introduced Mr James Parks of this place, as a witness, who proved that some months before, his house of business was entered, and a pair of Boots, shoes, leather and other articles were stolen therefrom. That he had never seen or heard of any of the articles since except the Boots, which he had recovered, & had only heard of them some four or five weeks after the robbery. Mr A. W. Clark was then next introduced by the State,

who proved that some three or four weeks ^{after} of hearing
of the Larceny being in the City of Raleigh, he saw
the Boots, identified by Parks, in the Store of Mr. Wychurch;
& recognized them as the Boots lost by Parks, and upon
returning to Hillsboro he reported this fact to Parks.
Mr. Wychurch proved that on ^{in doubt} the day which recognized
the Boots the Defendant Dennis Quinn brought the
Boots to him, openly and on the day took & removed
them to him for \$5, saying that he was on his way
down the country, and as he returned, if he had the
money he would redeem them. The boots were worth
\$9 - before defendant returned they were delivered
to Mr. Parks. This was the case for the State - no evidence
was offered by the defendant & the case was submitted
to the Jury under the charge of your Honor.
The charge of the Court was to the effect, that the only
evidence against the defendant was his possession of
the boots several weeks after the larceny, and that the
 lapse of time between the larceny & his so being found
in possession of the stolen goods, did not create such
a presumption in law of his guilt as would justify a
verdict of guilty, in the absence of any other testimony.
The Jury returned a verdict of Guilty, whereupon I as
Counsel for the defendant moved the Court to set aside the

verdict, and grant the defendant a new trial on
grounds that it was against the charge of the Court,
that there was not ^{sufficient} evidence to sustain it. This was
done and the defendant bound in his own recognizance
to appear at the Fall Term of the Court to answer. The
Court also directed that if at the next Term no further
evidence could be introduced by the State, that he should
enter a Vol. Pess. At Fall Term the case was again
called for trial, Council having been retained to appear
with the Solicitor. It was announced by the State that
additional evidence had been obtained, and the
second trial was had. The State introduced Mr. Parks,
Mr. White & Mr. Wychurch who all proved what they
proved on the former trial, neither more nor less.
Washington Day (colored) was then called by the State,
asked if he knew the defendant he said he did not.
Then asked if he knew him he made his being found
"he did not." This was the only additional testimony
that given in the first trial. The case was then argued
by Council & submitted under the charge of the Court,
which was in substance the same as in the first trial.
The Jury after retiring returned a verdict of Guilty.
I again moved the Court to set aside the
verdict and grant a new trial for the reasons stated.

Judge 1820

former trial - and in reply to the state, announced
that the fact of another jury having convicted the defendant
on the same evidence should not weigh into the count if the
conviction was an improper one, for that it was ^{as much} the duty of the
Court to protect the innocent, or those not convicted according
to the law & the evidence, as it was to punish the guilty.

I also said, that I was afraid that prejudice, unknown to
the jurors themselves, had entered the jury box, for that I
did not believe a white man would have been convicted
upon the evidence in the case, ^{if under the same charge from the Court.} I may have been wrong
in my opinion of the law, as applicable to the case, but I think
I was right then, and I am of the same opinion still.

Your Honor after hearing the motion argued, promptly
set aside the verdict & granted the defendant a new
trial, and in so doing did what, I think, was
eminently right and proper.

I have written this statement hastily, but think I have
omitted no material fact. My own conclusions are
as I have stated above.

Very respectfully

Your Obedt Servt

Henry M. Pease